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ABSTRACT 
For benefit corporations to persuade their various audiences that they 
are as beneficial for society as they claim, they need reliable assessments 
of their social performance. Even if assessments were not required by most 
states’ benefit corporation statutes, it is difficult to imagine the benefit 
corporation form could gain credibility without them. Creating 
measurement tools for these assessments poses the twin challenges of 
balancing simplicity against validity and weighing vision against 
inclusiveness. This article examines how B Lab’s popular assessment tool 
engages these challenges. 
 
CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 516 
I. THE IDEAL ASSESSMENT TOOL ......................................................... 519 
II. B LAB’S ASSESSMENT TOOL ............................................................ 523 
III. B LAB’S SCORE ............................................................................... 526 
A. Simplicity ...................................................................................... 526 
B. Validity ......................................................................................... 531 
1. Scale Independence .................................................................. 532 
2. Lack of Uniformity .................................................................. 534 
3. Failure to Deduct ...................................................................... 535 
4. Interchangeability of Categories .............................................. 537 
                                                     
* Downer Chair of Corporate Law and Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School. I would like to 
thank Rick Alexander, Bart Houlahan, and Dan Osusky, all of B Lab, for their insightful comments 
over the course of several conversations and for providing access to critical materials without which I 
could not have written this article. I would also like to thank Chuck O’Kelley for very kindly including 
me in this wonderful symposium on such an important and groundbreaking topic and all of the 
symposium participants for their helpful comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank Eman 
Al-Hassan for her able research assistance and thoughtful substantive suggestions. 
516 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 40:515 
5. Inadequate Verification ............................................................ 539 
C. Vision ........................................................................................... 541 
D. Inclusivity..................................................................................... 546 
E.  Reputational Capital v. Regulatory License ............................... 550 
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 553 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Benefit corporations advertise themselves as different from ordinary, 
for-profit companies. They are better, more responsible, and kinder, and 
should therefore be treated differently. Employees should be willing to 
work for them for less money and remain for longer periods because they 
treat their employees well and because working for them means trying to 
make the world a better place. Customers should seek out their products 
and services, even at a premium price, because customers should want to 
support the companies’ efforts to improve society. Investors should 
finance them even if the expected financial returns are lower because the 
social returns more than make up the difference. Communities should 
welcome and support them because they will prove to be loyal and 
dependable local citizens. 
To achieve all these benefits, though, these various audiences must 
buy the pitch; they must believe that benefit corporations will truly deliver 
their promises. Credibility is therefore the key challenge benefit 
corporations face. 
The Benefit Corporation Model Legislation (the Model Act) includes 
a few mechanisms to help boost the credibility of the entity’s social value.1  
Publicly traded corporations must have—and other corporations may 
have—a member of the board of directors designated as the “benefit 
director,” who must report annually on the company’s success in pursuing 
its social purpose.2 Benefit corporations may also appoint a “benefit 
officer” to fulfill whatever duties the company’s bylaws provide, including 
preparing the company’s benefit report.3 Shareholders who own at least 
2% of a class of the company’s outstanding shares have the power to bring 
a “benefit enforcement proceeding” against the corporation or its officers 
or directors for failing to provide a public benefit.4 Benefit corporations 
                                                     
 1. Most states that have passed legislation to enable benefit corporations have used some version 
of the Model Act, with Delaware and Washington being notable exceptions. Unlike the Model Act, 
Delaware’s statute does not require benefit corporations to assess their social performance against a 
third-party standard. 
 2. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §302 (2016). 
 3. Id. §§ 304, 401. 
 4. Id. § 305(c)(2)(i). 
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must also release an annual report analyzing their social performance and 
make this report available on the company’s website.5 The heart of this 
report is an “assessment of the overall social and environmental 
performance of the benefit corporation against a third-party standard.”6 
These safeguards are, for the most part, toothless. Nothing assures 
that the benefit director or officer has either the inclination or the power to 
monitor the company, and neither position is mandated in closely held 
corporations. The benefit enforcement proceeding can produce at most 
injunctive relief, because the Model Act bars financial liability.7 Plus, only 
the company itself, the directors, and certain large shareholders have 
standing to bring benefit enforcement proceedings.8 In closely held 
companies, none of these participants are likely to have an incentive to 
enforce the company’s social mission with a lawsuit, barring unusual 
circumstances.9 
The benefit report is therefore the only statutory measure likely to 
have a real impact on a benefit corporation’s credibility, and the utility of 
the report hinges on the quality of the third-party standard by which the 
company’s social performance is measured. It also depends on the 
credibility of the information the companies provide. 
The success of the benefit corporation experiment, then, rests on the 
ability of private entities to develop good standards to monitor companies’ 
disclosure statements for accuracy. 
The experiment must also avoid the pitfalls that have tripped up other 
third-party disclosure providers, such as credit ratings agencies.10 
Although the accuracy of these agencies’ ratings is theoretically assured 
by the agencies’ desire to preserve their valuable reputations (under 
“reputational capital theory”),11 the legal requirements to obtain ratings 
                                                     
 5. Id. §§ 401–402. 
 6. Id. § 401(a)(2). 
 7. Id. § 301(c) (directors are not personally liable for monetary damages for the company’s 
failure to create a public benefit); Id. § 303(c) (officers are not personally liable for monetary damages 
for the company’s failure to provide a public benefit); Id. § 305(b) (benefit corporations are not liable 
for monetary damages for failing to create a public benefit). 
 8. Id. § 305(c). 
 9. As of this writing, no publicly traded benefit corporations exist. Laureate Education, Inc., a 
benefit corporation, has announced its intention to complete a public offering, but has not yet done so. 
See Carrie Wells, Laureate Education Files for IPO, BALT. SUN (Oct. 2, 2015), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-laureate-ipo-20151002-story.html [https://perma.cc/ 
B26F-AMW8]. Etsy Inc. is a public company and a certified B Corp, but is not (at least not yet) a 
benefit corporation. See Jena McGregor, What Etsy, Patagonia, and Warby Parker Have in Common, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2015/ 
04/20/what-etsy-patagonia-and-warby-parker-have-in-common/ [https://perma.cc/Z9MF-MERN]. 
 10. I am indebted to Frank Partnoy for this point. 
 11. See, e.g., Nan S. Ellis et al., Is Imposing Liability on Credit Rating Agencies A Good Idea?: 
Credit Rating Agency Reform in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. & 
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from the agencies for various purposes have added a value to the ratings 
aside from their accuracy. The market’s disciplining impact on inaccurate 
ratings has been diluted by this alternative value source, reducing the 
agencies’ incentive to invest in accuracy (“regulatory license theory”).12 
The legal requirement for a third-party standard under the Model Act could 
suffer from similar weaknesses. 
B Lab, the pioneering nonprofit that invented benefit corporations 
and drafted the Model Act, offers a comprehensive third-party standard. 
In addition, B Lab offers companies the ability to earn certification as a 
“B Corp” by scoring sufficiently high on its assessment and paying an 
annual fee.13 Certified companies are potentially subject to periodic audits 
to ensure the information provided in the assessment is accurate.14 As of 
this writing, B Lab has certified more than 1,700 companies as B Corps,15 
while there are approximately 3,000 benefit corporations in the country.16 
In addition, B Lab says that more than 30,000 companies have registered 
to take its assessment.17 While not all certified companies are benefit 
corporations, these numbers indicate that B Lab’s assessment tool is 
incredibly important and influential in the benefit corporation community. 
This Article will therefore examine B Lab’s assessment tool. First, in 
Part I, I will discuss what an ideal assessment tool would look like; that is, 
                                                     
FIN. 175, 180 (2012); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 
70 VA. L. REV. 549, 604–05 (1984); Jonathan R. Macey, Wall Street Versus Main Street: How 
Ignorance, Hyperbole, and Fear Lead to Regulation, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1487, 1502–05 (1998). 
 12. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Ratings Agencies Are Not Like Other 
Gatekeepers, in YASUYUKI FUCHITA & ROBERT E. LITAN, FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY 
PROTECT INVESTORS? (2006); Frank Partnoy, Overdependence on Credit Ratings Was a Primary 
Cause of the Crisis, in LAWRENCE MITCHELL & ARTHUR WILMARTH, THE PANIC OF 2008: CAUSES, 
CONSEQUENCES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM (2010); Frank Partnoy, The Paradox of Credit 
Ratings, in RICHARD M. LEVITCH, ET AL., THE ROLE OF CREDIT REPORTING SYSTEMS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY (2002); Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a 
Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491 (2001); Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert 
of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Ratings Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619 
(1999). 
 13. See How to Become a B Corp., B LAB, https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-
to-become-a-b-corp [https://perma.cc/CK3J-T6J7]; Performance Requirements, B LAB, 
https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/performance-requirements 
[https://perma.cc/FZ7Z-A98D] [hereinafter Performance Requirements]; Pricing, B LAB, 
https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/make-it-official 
[https://perma.cc/RT23-78Q9]. 
 14. See Performance Requirements, supra note 13. 
 15. See B LAB, https://www.bcorporation.net/ [https://perma.cc/7JFV-67NT] (1,895 B Corps as 
of October 6, 2016). 
 16. See Nicole Fallon Taylor, Becoming a Benefit Corporation: Is it Right for Your Business?, 
BUS. NEWS DAILY (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/8734-benefit-corporation.html 
[https://perma.cc/GX7F-CCDP]. 
 17. See B Impact Assessment Overview, B LAB (on file with the author) [hereinafter Assessment 
Overview]. 
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I will provide an assessment tool for assessment tools. Then, in Part II, I 
will briefly describe B Lab’s assessment process before analyzing how 
well it achieves the goals of an ideal assessment in Part III and then 
summing up in the conclusion. 
I. THE IDEAL ASSESSMENT TOOL 
Designing the ideal assessment tool requires some thinking about the 
needs of the different groups that will use it.18 For some users, the purpose 
of the assessment tool is to provide “targeted transparency.”19 These users 
want disclosure of enough information to enable them to make educated 
choices, but not so much that they must choose between investing 
significant resources to digest the data and ignoring the data altogether. 
Consumers, for example, may be interested in purchasing products or 
services made by companies that mirror their social values. Such socially 
minded consumers need a quick and easy method of distinguishing  
pro-social companies from the purely profit focused. They will not invest 
the time needed to parse through a prolix securities-style disclosure 
statement. 
For these users, the information provided must be easily and quickly 
digestible or it is useless, because the decisions at stake are insufficiently 
valuable to warrant bearing significant information costs.  Users in this 
category likely include not only consumers but also employees and some 
communities: market participants who would like to encourage pro-social 
corporate behavior but only if the cost of doing so is fairly minimal. 
Users with more at stake may want disclosures that are significantly 
more voluminous, or “robust transparency.” Lenders, investors, and some 
communities may need more than a superficial sense that a company seeks 
something beyond profits. Because these groups’ investments can be 
substantial, they are likely to require much more detailed information 
about the extent to which a company is aiding society in its operations. 
With so much more at stake, they also have the required incentive to invest 
the time and expertise to digest a more extensive disclosure device. 
Perhaps the most critical members of the audience for an assessment 
tool are the pro-social companies themselves. The assessment methods for 
benefit corporations are by statute selected by the company being 
assessed.20 In order to appeal to this group, an assessment tool must be 
cheap and easy to use. Few benefit corporations are likely to choose a tool 
                                                     
 18. I am indebted to Anne Tucker for pointing this out. 
 19. See Daniel E. Ho, Fudging the Nudge: Information Disclosure and Restaurant Grading, 122 
YALE L.J. 574, 578 (2012) (describing targeted transparency). 
 20. See MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 401 (2016). 
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that demands too much in terms of executive attention or financial 
resources, at least if less burdensome alternatives are available. 
At the same time, an assessment tool that lacks credibility will 
provide little benefit. In order to obtain the tangible benefits that may be 
associated with benefit corporation status—such as inducing employees to 
work harder and consumers to pay more—a business must find a means of 
communicating a credible message of its pro-social nature. The 
assessment tool is instrumental in these efforts, since it purportedly 
measures the company’s social virtue. If consumers, employees, or other 
target audiences disbelieve the measure, it will do the company little good. 
For benefit corporations, then, the assessment tool must be both cheap and 
credible; they desire both “credible transparency” and “efficient 
transparency.” 
The three major audiences for assessments tools have sometimes 
overlapping, sometimes conflicting goals. These can be usefully broken 
down into four categories: simplicity, validity, vision, and inclusiveness.21 
The tool should be simple both to use and to understand, consistent 
with the goals of targeted and efficient transparency. Companies should 
not have to spend a great deal of time or money to apply the tool and obtain 
a measurement of their social contributions. They should be able to use 
metrics they are already gathering for other purposes to minimize expense. 
Consumers of the information—employees, customers, investors, 
communities—should be able to understand the results easily without the 
sort of detailed, difficult reading involved in parsing a prospectus, for 
example. A single letter grade (A through F), descriptor (gold, silver, 
bronze), or numeric score would be ideal if it could convey all the 
information desired. 
The tool should produce valid results. A simple and cheap metric is 
useless if it does not measure what it aims to assess. Part of validity is 
accuracy; there must be some method of assuring that the results the 
company reports are both precise—the company did not err—and 
honest—the company did not lie. Both will generally require some 
objective, outside confirmation. In other words, the results must be 
credibly transparent. 
To count as valid, a measure must also comport with the user’s goals. 
For example, a chef who wants to ensure a turkey is cooked might measure 
the bird’s surface temperature. That would not be a valid measure because 
the oven will heat the surface of the turkey before the interior, so the 
                                                     
 21. There is no method of program evaluation that works for all types of programs. Instead, a 
program evaluation method must be tailored to the particular context. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, 
Desire, Conservatism, Underfunding, Congressional Meddling, and Study Fatigue: Ingredients for 
Ongoing Reform at the Securities and Exchange Commission?, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 443, 451–52 (2012). 
2017] Assessing the Assessment 521 
surface might be very hot but the interior might still be raw. A valid 
measure would take the turkey’s interior temperature because that does 
correspond with what the chef wants to know—whether the meat is 
cooked. Therefore, measures are not universally valid or invalid in the 
sense I am using the terms; a measure’s validity depends on its user’s goal. 
The assessment must reflect a coherent vision of how companies 
should be helping society. There is no single, correct view of what it means 
to be a socially responsible company, but an assessment tool should 
represent some particular conception. A measurement tool will 
unavoidably reflect some perspective on this question; by giving credit (or 
taking credit away) for certain actions or policies, the tool will necessarily 
push some vision. So it is critical that the vision be self-consciously 
constructed, consistent, and articulated clearly so that both companies and 
the consumers of the results know what a good score on the assessment 
means. This criterion is related to validity; vision sets the goals, and 
validity ensures that what is being measured meets them. Vision is also 
part of targeted transparency, because it helps make scores easy to 
understand. 
Finally, a measurement tool should be inclusive. Even within the 
scope of a coherent vision for socially responsible entities, individual 
companies will choose to emphasize different aspects of that vision. Some 
might focus on environmental responsibility, others on helping the 
disadvantaged, and still others on making the workplace flexible and 
family-friendly. The measurement tool should be sufficiently flexible to 
reward companies for embracing some aspects of the vision, even if they 
do not successfully implement them all. 
There is a fifth characteristic that is often cited as important for 
assessment tools: the independence of the drafting body.22 For example, 
the American National Standards Institute’s accreditation rules for 
standards creators mandate: 
The standards development process shall not be dominated by any 
single interest category, individual or organization. Dominance 
means a position or exercise of dominant authority, leadership, or 
influence by reason of superior leverage, strength, or representation 
to the exclusion of fair and equitable consideration of other 
viewpoints.23 
                                                     
 22. I am grateful to Dan Osusky for raising this point. 
 23. ANSI Essential Requirements: Due Process Requirements for American National Standards 
AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., § 1.2 (Jan. 2016), https://share.ansi.org/shared%20 
documents/Standards%20Activities/American%20National%20Standards/Procedures,%20Guides,%
20and%20Forms/2016_ANSI_Essential_Requirements.pdf [https://perma.cc/VM4H-S7YV]. 
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The standards setter’s independence and objectivity are important, 
but only indirectly. Ultimately what matters is whether the standards meet 
the four substantive goals. Independence tends to boost confidence that the 
standards setter will design the standards in good faith, but it is a means to 
an end, not the end itself. 
B Lab has an incentive to set an easy standard. Companies pay for 
certification only if they qualify by earning at least 80 out of 200 possible 
points on the B Impact Assessment (BIA).24 The more companies that 
qualify, the larger the group of companies that might pay B Lab for 
certification. 
To avoid this conflict of interest, the BIA is not written by B Lab.  
Instead, the Standards Advisory Council (the Council) controls the BIA.25 
The Council consists of independent experts and representatives of 
different stakeholder groups.26 Bart Houlahan, B Lab’s co-founder, is a 
member of the Council’s Developed Markets subgroup.27 There are also 
two members of B Lab listed as members of the Health and Safety 
Working Group.28 But the vast majority of Council members are 
employees of separate and independent organizations.29 Both because the 
Council appears to be (mostly) independent of B Lab, and because the 
Council’s independence is only indirectly important to the BIA’s 
effectiveness, I will not further address this issue in this Article. 
There are significant tensions among the four substantive goals of 
simplicity, validity, vision, and inclusivity. A simple measure of a 
behavior as complex as pro-social economic activity is unlikely to be 
valid. Conversely, a measure sufficiently sophisticated to capture that 
activity is unlikely to be simple. Similarly, an assessment tool that presents 
a strong vision will have difficulty including those who disagree with 
aspects of the vision, and an assessment tool that attempts to include 
everyone is unlikely to possess a coherent vision. No assessment tool can 
achieve perfection across all four goals. Instead, assessment designers 
must choose how heavily to weigh each of these values in trading one off 
against the others. The next Part will set out the major aspects of B Lab’s 
assessment tool, and the following section will explore how well that tool 
makes these trade-off decisions. 
                                                     
 24. See How to Become a B Corp., supra note 13. 
 25. See Frequently Asked Questions, B LAB, http://bimpactassessment.net/how-it-works/ 
frequently-asked-questions/top-10#who-develops-the-standards [https://perma.cc/4NALUCYK]. 
 26. See Standards Advisory Council, B CORPORATION, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-
b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps/standards-advisory-council [https://perma.cc/3Y75-NX6L]. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. (listing Council members). 
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II. B LAB’S ASSESSMENT TOOL 
B Lab’s assessment tool, known as the “B Impact Assessment” or 
“BIA,” (which recall is written by the Council, not B Lab directly) consists 
of an online questionnaire available on its website.30 The assessment is 
customized based on the company’s size (six categories), its industry 
sector (four categories), and the state of development of its geographic 
market (three categories).31 As a result, there are in effect seventy-two 
different versions of the BIA.32 Plus, there are addenda for a few industries 
whose impact the Council feels the BIA does not adequately measure on 
its own. These include micro-finance lenders, investors and investment 
advisors, and environmentally friendly building companies.33 
Companies answer the questions online and receive an aggregate 
score on a 200-point scale.34 Companies that score 80 points or above 
qualify for certification, but benefit corporations may use the assessment 
to fulfill their requirement of measuring their social performance against 
a third-party standard regardless of whether they are seeking certification 
status or qualify for certification.35 
The BIA asks questions that cover four “impact areas.” These include 
governance, workers, community, and the environment.36 Each impact 
area (and each indicator within each impact area) is allocated points based 
on the Council’s view of the relative importance of that area or indicator 
for companies in the relevant category (industry, size, etc.).37 
B Lab says that the BIA’s governance questions measure, “[t]he 
extent to which social and environmental considerations are engrained into 
the business, financial responsibility and oversight, transparency, and the 
prevention of negative outcomes.”38 Governance is important to a 
company’s pro-social orientation, according to B Lab, because it 
demonstrates a company’s ability and inclination to act benevolently.39 
Questions the BIA asks under this category include inquiries about the 
company’s code of ethics; anti-corruption systems; financial controls; 
whistleblower policies; independence, composition, and activity of the 
board of directors; policies concerning growth; shareholder engagement; 
                                                     
 30. See B LAB, www.bimpactassessment.net [https://perma.cc/9YBD-RL7W]. 
 31. See Assessment Overview, supra note 17. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Interview with Dan Osusky, B Lab Standards Associate (May 23, 2016) (notes on file with 
the author) [hereinafter Osusky Interview]. 
 38. See Assessment Overview, supra note 17. 
 39. Id. 
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CEO compensation; employee training and evaluation; feedback from 
stakeholders; and other comparable issues.40 
The workers category is aimed at discovering the company’s 
treatment of its employees along four dimensions: financial, social, 
physical, and professional.41 The BIA asks about these categories because 
they are directly important, not because they may indirectly lead to 
achieving other important values, as was true of the governance questions. 
This category includes questions on topics such as: employee ownership; 
employee governance rights; employee compensation structure; 
percentage of employees who work full-time versus part-time; worker 
training programs; internal promotions; benefits provided, such as health 
care and retirement; maternity and paternity leave; vacation; severance 
benefits; safety standards; wellness programs; worker satisfaction; and 
related topics.42 
Community questions attempt to discover the company’s impact on 
the communities in which it functions. This includes not only the creation 
of jobs but also charitable donations and stimulus of other companies in 
the region.43 This is also an area where the BIA is attempting to measure 
a company’s beneficial impact directly, unlike the governance category. 
The community questions inquire as to the company’s charitable 
donations; its involvement with the charities to which it donates beyond 
the donation itself; the impact of the company’s product or service; 
transparency as to the company’s supply chain; the company’s use of 
small-scale suppliers; the company’s vigilance as to working conditions at 
its suppliers’ facilities; sourcing from under-served supplier groups, such 
as those in low-income areas; sourcing from local suppliers; sales to local 
consumers; employment of the chronically underemployed, such as those 
discriminated against because of race, gender, ethnicity, religion, 
disability, sexual orientation, drug or alcohol dependency, homelessness, 
or history of incarceration; use and treatment of micro-distributors; 
contribution to national and local economic development; partnerships 
with local organizations such as cooperative groups or chambers of 
commerce; advocacy for better social or environmental industry standards; 
paid leave for charitable work for employees; and other, similar topics.44 
The environmental section of the BIA awards points for companies 
that reduce their environmental footprint all along the supply chain.45 This 
                                                     
 40. See B Impact Assessment Spreadsheet V. 5 (Feb. 1, 2016) (on file with the author) [hereinafter 
Assessment Spreadsheet]. 
 41. See Assessment Overview, supra note 17. 
 42. See Assessment Spreadsheet, supra note 40. 
 43. See Assessment Overview, supra note 17. 
 44. See Assessment Spreadsheet, supra note 40. 
 45. See Assessment Overview, supra note 17. 
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category also consists of ways the company is directly benefitting the 
world, in this case by reducing the harm done to the environment through 
the production process. This section inquires about the amount of carbon 
offset by the company’s environmental practices; the extent to which solid 
waste from any manufacturing processes are recycled, reused, or 
composted; the percentage of energy used that comes from renewable 
sources; the percentage of manufacturing facilities that meet green 
building standards; whether the company annually measures and reports 
its energy and water usage, carbon emissions, and waste; whether the 
company has reviewed the life cycle impact of its products; efforts to 
reduce water usage in manufacturing; efforts to reduce use of toxic 
chemicals in manufacturing; the extent to which the distribution system 
involves clean emission vehicles; ways in which the product or service 
itself might benefit the environment, whether through education, 
measurement, or direct environmental impact as through conservation or 
production of clean energy; and other, similar questions.46 
For companies that are seeking B Corp certification—but not for 
those benefit corporations who are merely using the BIA as a third-party 
standard to satisfy the statutory disclosure requirements—B Lab requires 
companies to submit supporting documentation for a random selection of 
questions.47 This requirement applies not only to the initial application for 
certification but also to every application for recertification.48 Companies 
that wish to maintain their B Corp certification must apply for 
recertification every other year.49 In addition, B Lab sometimes performs 
a site review, which consists of facilities tours, employee interviews, and 
more in-depth documentation requests.50 All publicly traded B Corps are 
required to undergo a site review during every application for certification 
or recertification, as are all companies that are wholly owned by a publicly 
traded corporation.51 Otherwise, companies enter a lottery in which 
approximately ten percent of all B Corps applying for certification or 
recertification receive a site visit in any given year.52 
To secure certification, a company must disclose its score in each of 
the four impact areas on a public webpage.53 Publicly traded companies 
and companies that are wholly owned by them must disclose their answers 
                                                     
 46. See Assessment Spreadsheet, supra note 40. 
 47. See Osusky Interview, supra note 37. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See id. 
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to every question (with some exceptions).54 Other certified companies are 
rewarded with points for providing transparency such as this but are not 
required to provide this level of detail.55 
III. B LAB’S SCORE 
The BIA represents a sincere and sophisticated attempt to create a 
useful metric for profit-seeking companies. It scores well on each of the 
four criteria of simplicity, validity, vision, and inclusivity. Nevertheless, 
because these criteria are themselves in some tension, the BIA necessarily 
sacrifices some criteria for others at various points. I will analyze each of 
the criteria in turn, then conclude this section with some thoughts about 
whether this is a context that is better described by reputational capital 
theory or regulatory license theory. 
A. Simplicity 
The ideal tool to measure a company’s contributions to the world 
would first and foremost be simple to use and understand. The various 
constituent groups who might be interested in a company’s pro-social 
rating will find that rating more useful the cheaper and easier it is. If the 
rating system requires users to absorb dense documents akin to securities 
filings, its audience will be considerably more limited than if the 
information is communicated quickly and easily. 
At first glance, the BIA seems to do a very good job of providing a 
metric that is simple for investors, consumers, and suppliers to use without 
careful parsing of complicated reports. The results are summarized in a 
single number, with higher scores indicating companies that provide 
greater social benefits than companies with lower scores. Although the 
maximum score is 200, companies scoring 80 points or higher may receive 
B Lab’s certification.56 
The BIA awards points for answers that indicate a company has  
pro-social policies or activities in one of its four impact areas. The test 
does not subtract points for antisocial policies or activities. This focus on 
the positive may present validity issues, as I will discuss below, but it does 
have the virtue of adding to the test’s simplicity. Measuring the company’s 
negative impact and designing a system that can somehow offset the 
negative against the positive would make the system more complex. 
Although the use of a single, all-encompassing score makes the BIA 
seem admirably simple on its surface, the BIA is actually more 
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complicated than it first appears, both for those who might rely on the 
score and for the rated companies. This becomes apparent when we drill 
down to how that core is calculated. 
In the Council’s efforts to tailor the BIA to companies of different 
sizes, from different industries, and from countries at different stages of 
economic development, much of the BIA’s simplicity was unfortunately 
lost. As a result, it is not really possible to compare companies’ 
contributions to society simply on the basis of their total BIA score. For 
example, a company that employs 10,000 people and earns a score of 100 
on the BIA likely impacts the world much more substantially than a 
company that employs two people but has a BIA score of 140. For 
interested parties to use the BIA score effectively, they must look deeper. 
The score is a useful way to compare companies within the same category, 
but there are seventy-two categories. The score is only illuminating when 
we are, say, comparing two agricultural companies, each of which 
employs around a thousand people and both of which operate in developed 
countries. To compare one of these companies to a manufacturing 
company, or an agricultural company in a developing economy, it is not 
really possible to use only the final BIA score, even if the companies are 
of similar size. 
The problem is not only that different companies with the same score 
may have vastly different impacts on the world but also that the scores 
themselves are compiled differently. The identical BIA question may be 
allocated different weightings based on the company’s category. There 
may be good reasons for this difference, rooted in an effort to make the 
BIA evaluation more valid. But, this effort to improve the BIA’s validity 
imposes a serious cost to the test’s simplicity. 
In order to compare a company to another that falls into a different 
one of the BIA’s seventy-two categories, it is necessary to look at the 
answers to the assessment’s individual questions. But few companies are 
required to grant access to this level of information. The Model Act does 
require benefit corporations to provide the public with an “assessment of 
the overall social and environmental performance of the benefit 
corporation against a third-party standard.”57 They must also disclose their 
rationale for selecting the standard they chose.58 But, benefit corporations 
have enormous latitude in designing the precise content of their benefit 
reports, and this discretion extends to the detail they provide in assessing 
their performance against a third-party standard. In addition, not all 
companies certified by B Lab are benefit corporations. The benefit 
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corporation statute does not bind those that are ordinary corporations or 
limited liability companies. 
B Lab itself also imposes disclosure requirements on certified 
companies. B Lab requires public companies and wholly owned 
subsidiaries of public companies to provide their scores on every 
question.59 Those who interact with certified public companies and wholly 
owned subsidiaries, then, will have access to the detailed information 
required to make reasonable comparisons. Other companies, however, are 
only required to provide their total score and their subtotals for each 
impact area.60 Even when this information is available, interpreting 
companies’ answers and scores on the assessment is much more 
complicated and time consuming than looking at a single score. 
So far, I have focused on the experience of stakeholders outside the 
company who wish to evaluate the business’s pro-social status. For them, 
the BIA is a mixed bag; there is a simple, all-encompassing score 
available, but it does not really provide much information, especially if the 
goal is to compare companies of different sizes, in different industries, or 
which operate in different sorts of economies. For the companies 
themselves, the simplicity picture is considerably worse. 
B Lab advertises that the assessment takes two to four hours to 
complete.61 However, the amount of time it takes a company to complete 
the assessment depends on the type of information the company typically 
maintains in the ordinary course. For example, the BIA asks questions 
about the amount of carbon that was offset by the company’s 
environmental practices over the course of the previous twelve months.62  
Some companies may track this information, but others may not. Even 
companies that do track their carbon impact may not do so in a way that 
easily lends itself to answering this question. A company may only track 
its carbon impact retrospectively at the end of its fiscal year, and may not 
be able to provide an accurate answer except at that time. Questions like 
these may, therefore, require some work to research the answers.  
Companies that have a lot of research to do may need more than the 
estimated time to complete the BIA. In addition, companies that 
participate in certain industries—microfinance, investing or investment 
advising, or green building—must complete specific industry addenda.63 
Once the company has completed the assessment, B Lab randomly 
selects six to eight questions on which the company gave positive answers 
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 62. See Assessment Spreadsheet, supra note 40. 
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(answers that garnered points) for documentary support.64 The applicant 
must provide evidence that supports its answers to these questions.65 For 
some questions, this may be a simple process. Documenting the health care 
plans provided to employees, for instance, should be quite straightforward. 
But documenting the amount of carbon reduced by a company’s new, 
more efficient product may be more complex, involving laboratory studies 
of both the new product and the old, as well as studies that measure 
whether both products perform in real-world conditions as they did in the 
lab. Then there must be documentation of sales of the new product and 
survey data of customers to document any changes in usage when they 
replace the old product with the new. Some companies will have done this 
research already in the ordinary course, as part of their marketing or 
licensing process, but others may face this problem for the first time when 
performing the assessment. It is possible that B Lab would not require 
documentation as extensive as I am suggesting, but the gains made to the 
simplicity goal there would be offset by losses to validity. 
After a company has completed the BIA and uploaded the supporting 
documentation, it must participate in an assessment review.66 The review 
consists of a phone call with a B Lab staff member in which the staff 
member will go over questions that companies may have found difficult 
or unclear. B Lab says this phone call typically lasts sixty to ninety 
minutes.67 
Companies that qualify for certification after completing the 
assessment review—that is, companies that score at least 80 points—must 
submit still more documentation. B Lab will select several (one to six) 
questions from the Business Impact Model portion of the BIA and ask for 
additional documentation to support the positive (point garnering) 
responses to those questions. B Lab may also ask for additional documents 
to clarify companies’ answers.68 
Companies must then complete an additional set of questions, the 
Disclosure Questionnaire. This begins as a one-page document consisting 
of a series of “yes-no” and “true-false” questions about fines, sanctions, 
litigation, and any “sensitive” practices.69 Companies that have paid any 
fines, been subject to any sanctions, or otherwise engaged in activities, 
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 66. See Performance Requirements, supra note 13. 
 67. See id. 
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practices, or suffered events B Lab deems problematic, must disclose these 
issues on the company’s public Impact Report, describe how the company 
has dealt with the issue, and demonstrate that management has taken steps 
to ensure that the issue will not occur again.70 Companies engaged in 
production or trade in illegal products, hard alcohol, commercial logging, 
guns or other weapons, for example, fall into this must disclose and 
explain category.71 Companies that have set up corporate structures to 
minimize tax liability must also disclose and explain this behavior (though 
apparently not if they minimized their taxes through other means). The 
same applies to companies that conduct animal testing, employ workers 
under the age of fifteen, require employees to work overtime, employ 
prisoners, forbid collective bargaining, or own facilities near sensitive 
ecosystems.72 The answers to these questions will not affect a company’s 
score, but B Lab reserves the right to refuse certification “if the company 
is ultimately deemed not to uphold the spirit of the community.”73 
B Lab staff conduct background checks on companies that score over 
80 points on the BIA to supplement the Disclosure Questionnaire. The 
background check consists of a search of public records concerning the 
company, its brand, and its executives. The results of the background 
check may also result in a decision to deny certification.74 
Even after a company has cleared all of these hurdles and obtained 
certification, B Lab may select the company for a more in-depth 
certification evaluation.75 Ten percent of all certified B companies are 
chosen at random for this process each year, and certified companies that 
are either publicly traded or wholly owned by a publicly traded company 
are required to undergo certification evaluation once during every two-
year certification period.76 These evaluations involve more in-depth 
documentation of a company’s responses on the BIA and may also include 
facilities tours and employee interviews.77 
To sum up BIA’s performance on the simplicity criterion, the single 
score summary—and the four impact area scores—provide a very simple 
method for users to determine a company’s pro-social impact. This sort of 
one-dimensional metric works well in simpler contexts, such as city health 
inspectors’ reports on restaurants’ cleanliness. But users of the BIA data 
need much more nuanced information than restaurant customers do. 
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Investors, customers, communities, and employees will each care about 
different aspects of the BIA report, even within a given impact area. The 
summary score is simple, but it provides too little information to be terribly 
useful.78 
Many of those interested in a company’s pro-social performance will 
need the detailed information that comes only from answers to individual 
questions. For this audience, it is not clear that the point system adds much 
value. As I will discuss below, the point system requires the Council to 
establish a values system, and it is difficult to imagine any values system 
that could be universally accepted. The Council’s system has the added 
flaw that it lacks transparency; the Council has not articulated the 
principles it uses to decide how to distribute point allocations among the 
different categories based on which of the seventy-two boxes a company 
occupies. This means that sophisticated users will still need to parse 
individual questions rather than defer to the BIA’s scoring system. Only 
causal users—such as consumers who may slightly prefer to buy products 
made by pro-social companies—will find the summary scores useful. 
Users with more sophisticated needs, such as investors, communities, and 
even some customers, will need to look much more closely. B Lab does 
sell access to some detailed information through its analytics program, but 
this information is anonymized unless a company consents to revealing its 
particular answers.79 For many certified companies, this more detailed 
information will not be available; so, for the more sophisticated users, the 
utility of the entire system is doubtful. 
B. Validity 
Simplicity is important because if the measure is too complex, it is 
possible that no one will use it. At least equally important is that the 
measure be valid—that it accurately measures the characteristics that users 
care about. 
Validity is in tension with simplicity. To see why this is so, it may 
be helpful to compare assessments to theoretical models. The closer a 
model is to reality, the more complex it is and, therefore, the less useful.  
A simple model more often provides clear lessons but is easily 
                                                     
 78. Note that a recent empirical study of restaurant health ratings brought the utility of even these 
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manipulated. A complicated model is more accurate but much harder to 
design and use and is less likely to provide clear policy recommendations. 
An assessment is like a model. Assessments of pro-social behavior 
attempt to develop an algorithm for what actions and policies count as 
beneficial and then apply that algorithm to real companies. A simple 
assessment is easy to use and understand, such as an assessment evaluating 
companies based on whether they offer health insurance to their 
employees. The simplest version of that assessment would credential any 
company that offered its employees any health insurance plan. Although 
this assessment model is very simple, it is not very valid. If any health plan 
will suffice, then companies that offer complete coverage will be ranked 
the same as companies that pay for only catastrophic illnesses. Companies 
whose plan has no deductible will be placed on the same level as those 
whose plan requires families to pay the first several thousand dollars of 
expenses out of pocket. Additionally, companies that do not reimburse 
insureds for contraception or abortion services will appear identical to 
those that do. 
On the other end of the spectrum, a valid and complex assessment 
risks rendering the assessment useless to all but the most sophisticated 
readers. For example, a health care assessment could provide the entire 
text of the health insurance policy. This assessment would be highly valid 
as an explanation of the health care the company provides but would be 
the opposite of simple. 
Using just the summary score is the simplest use of the BIA and, 
therefore, the use that seems likely to be the most popular. This section 
will, for that reason, focus on the score’s validity. Note, though, that at 
least some certified companies are required to provide much more detailed 
information about their BIA responses. For these companies, the validity 
concerns outlined below are more muted. 
The summary score provides a single number, as though companies’ 
positive impact on society could be ranked linearly, with companies that 
earned higher scores unambiguously better for society than those with 
lower scores. But this is a deeply problematic notion as applied to the BIA 
for at least five reasons: scale independence, lack of uniformity, failure to 
deduct for negative impact, interchangeability of categories, and 
inadequate verification. I will discuss each of these in turn. 
1. Scale Independence 
An accurate assessment of a company’s positive social impact should 
take scale into account. A company that puts solar panels on a million 
homes has a much larger effect on the world than one that puts solar panels 
on a thousand homes. But that is not how the BIA works. The BIA score 
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does not award more points for companies that are larger, holding all else 
equal. The questions and point allocations do change based on the size of 
the company, as measured by the number of employees, but the BIA does 
not reward companies for being larger and having a greater impact on 
society. As a result, a company that employs a thousand former convicts 
could have a lower score than a similar company that employs only ten. 
Thus, for an outside investor, consumer, or community trying to decide 
how to allocate their investment, consumption, or tax dollars, the score 
alone is potentially misleading and could produce a misallocation of 
resources. 
One possible explanation for the Council’s decision to structure the 
BIA as scale independent, in this sense, may be purely pragmatic. 
Questions aimed at larger companies may not be sensible when asked of 
smaller companies. For example, it seems ludicrous to ask a company 
without employees about its employee benefits. Another possible 
explanation is that the Council decided that it wanted the BIA to measure 
how virtuous a company is and not how much good it actually achieves. 
Perhaps the BIA is intended to measure social good achieved per person 
employed, rather than the absolute amount of good provided. There is 
some value to this sort of measure that the BIA provides; an assessment 
tool that tried to do otherwise might produce bizarre results. For example, 
if a company the size of Walmart reduced its greenhouse gas emissions by 
one percent, an assessment tool that measured total social good produced 
would report the company as a much more environmentally friendly 
company than a local installer of geothermal power, even if the company’s 
business model and other practices were not at all pro-social. Still, the BIA 
ought to make some effort to capture the scale effect as well as a 
company’s virtuous nature. One way to do this might be a separate 
measure for the total volume of benefits provided to society. Precise 
measurements in this area would likely be impossible, but a rough 
indicator might be the company’s virtue index multiplied by some size 
factor. This sort of measure could be performed for each of the BIA’s 
impact areas to provide a more comprehensive sense of what types of 
benefits a company is providing. This additional metric would add 
complexity relative to the attractive simplicity of a single,  
all-encompassing number; but if the single number’s appearance of 
including every aspect of a company’s pro-social behavior is illusory, as I 
argue in this section, it might be worthwhile to sacrifice some degree of 
simplicity to capture the impact of a company’s scale. 
One further note on scale—the number of employees may not be the 
most useful way for the BIA to measure a company’s size. It is helpful for 
determining the impact of a company’s employment policies, such as 
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flexible work schedules, maternity or paternity leave, and generosity of 
benefits; however, it may not capture the company’s impact in other areas. 
For example, a company may have relatively few employees yet have an 
enormous impact in lobbying for social change or developing a cleaner, 
cheaper, more sustainable energy source. Different measures of size, 
therefore, may be necessary depending on the type of benefit that is being 
measured. 
2. Lack of Uniformity 
Besides the issue of scale, there are a number of other ways in which 
the BIA fails to treat like companies alike. Companies from different 
industries are provided with different questions. Even when companies are 
asked the same question, the answers are sometimes scaled differently, so 
that the same answer garners a different number of points. For example, 
one question on the BIA asks, “Is there an annual conflict of interest 
questionnaire filled out by all board members and officers?”80 Companies 
from developed economies with 50 to 999 employees can earn .2 points if 
they answer this question positively,81 while companies of the same size 
and in the same industries but in emerging economies can earn .4 points 
(twice the score) from a positive answer.82 
These discrepancies may result for a number of reasons. The impact 
area may have been assigned a different number of points based on the 
category involved.83 Alternatively, even if the impact area as a whole has 
been assigned the same number of points, the impact area may contain a 
different number of questions based on the category so that the same 
number of points must be divided among a different number of questions.84 
Because companies that fall into different categories are rated 
differently, the BIA is not terribly useful for making comparisons between 
companies. This is not only a problem for simplicity, as discussed above 
but also a challenge to the BIA’s validity. A score of 80 points on the 
BIA—which qualifies a company for B Lab certification—means 
something different for companies in different categories. To be valid, the 
score should measure what users of the measure want it to measure. But if 
the score measures different things for different companies, the score can 
be valid only if these variations comport to broader principles that users 
embrace. 
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The BIA may be varying its point structure according to underlying 
principles, but it is difficult to come to any firm conclusions based on the 
information B Lab and the Council have disclosed. Questions that are 
extremely important to determine some companies’ environmental 
responsibility, for example, may be completely pointless to ask of others. 
The BIA quite rightly asks agricultural companies what percentage of the 
fertilizer they use is organic.85 But it would add little value to ask that same 
question of a service or manufacturing company. Similarly, the monitoring 
of the output of hazardous and toxic wastewater may matter a great deal 
to a manufacturing company’s profile but not to that of a retail sales 
operation.86 As B Lab states in explaining this approach, “For each impact 
area and goal, weightings and indicators are adaptive to the material issues 
for that particular business based on their size, sector, and market.”87 
In this sense, it may not be feasible to have a metric that permits 
perfect comparisons across industries, sizes, or markets. Perhaps including 
questions that are tailored to the relevant segment is worth the sacrifice in 
comparability. Still, at a minimum, B Lab could apply some labeling to 
highlight this fact and make it clear that a score of 80 for a ten-person 
service provider in the United States means something different from an 
identical score earned by an agricultural cooperative in Brazil with five 
thousand employees. A simple three-letter code for each category 
indicating where the company falls could achieve this easily and cheaply. 
A code like this would remind users that the scores are not fit for 
intercompany comparisons except within categories and it would tell them 
where to look if they do want to make such comparisons. Even if a perfect 
comparison is not available, comparing two medium-sized agricultural 
companies may be better than comparing two companies with no 
overlapping categories. 
Also, the Council should provide greater transparency about the 
underlying principles it applies in allocating points based on a company’s 
category. Even if the Council does not wish to disclose the detailed 
breakdown (though this would be ideal), the more important disclosure is 
really the rules it is using.  Disclosure of these rules would grant users a 
much clearer sense of the scores’ meaning. 
3. Failure to Deduct 
A corporation’s impact on society is the result not only of the positive 
impacts of its actions but also of any negative effects from its conduct. A 
company that trains unemployed workers in new skills to help them find 
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jobs may also treat its own employees poorly. A valid assessment should, 
therefore, take into account both the positive and negative impacts of a 
company’s behavior in order to arrive at an overall understanding of the 
company’s influence for good or for ill. 
The BIA scoring methodology, however, counts only the positive.  
As B Lab states, “All indicators represent the positive impact of a 
company, and are intended to exceed universal business norms. There are 
no negative points in the assessment.”88 A company could, therefore, score 
well on the BIA despite engaging in powerfully negative behaviors whose 
impact outweighed its positive actions. 
The Council did include a safeguard to guard against credentialing 
some such companies. All companies applying for B Lab certification 
must complete a separate disclosure questionnaire aimed at uncovering 
applicants’ negative conduct.89 A company that employed forced labor or 
had been convicted of violating important domestic laws could be barred 
from certification despite scoring over 80 points on the BIA.90 
Barring a company from certification is a binary solution and, 
therefore, is inadequate as a means of incorporating a company’s negative 
actions into the assessment of its social impact. Companies whose negative 
activity does not rise to a level sufficient to warrant denial of certification 
escape without consequence for their bad behavior on the BIA. Also, 
because denial of certification may seem harsh in many cases, B Lab may 
prove reluctant to impose bans except in relatively extreme cases. B Lab 
also has the option of requiring disclosure of negative activity or of asking 
the applicant to remediate the issue, but enforcement of these lesser steps 
depends ultimately on the threat of denial of certification, which may not 
prove credible in many cases. 
In addition, neither B Lab nor the Council has provided detailed 
information about what sorts of conduct may warrant a denial of 
certification. Without greater transparency, the threat of a ban will have 
little deterrent effect; when companies are unaware that a particular action 
could lead to losing the opportunity to become a certified B corporation, 
they will not take that possibility into account when deciding on their 
future conduct. 
Deducting points for behavior that harms society is a complicated 
undertaking. To add this feature to the BIA, the Council would have to 
develop complex standards tied to companies’ size, industry, and the 
development status of their home countries. Such standards would be 
difficult to design and complicated to explain, justify, and enforce, greatly 
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undermining the simplicity goal. They also would risk offending 
companies that use the BIA or seek certification by penalizing behavior 
that some companies feel are acceptable or even beneficial. But these are 
the same barriers that the Council had to overcome to create the BIA’s 
measurements of companies’ positive behaviors. So, these obstacles are a 
poor explanation for refusing to take the same plunge in evaluating 
negative behavior as the Council did in evaluating positive behavior. 
It seems critical to add this feature to the BIA if the scores are to meet 
the validity goal.  Users of the BIA are almost certainly interested in 
companies’ net impact on society—both the ways companies help and 
harm the world; leaving out the negative half of this equation seems an 
odd decision that greatly undermines the BIA’s utility. Taking negative 
conduct into account would allow the BIA score to better reflect 
companies’ social impact and avoid the problems inherent with the current 
binary system, in which the Council’s only option is to deny certification 
for companies that exceed some (undisclosed) level of negative behavior. 
4. Interchangeability of Categories 
Investors, consumers, employees, and communities may care about 
different aspects of a company’s pro-social profile. Some consumers may 
focus exclusively on the company’s environmental policies, while some 
communities may be most interested in how a company treats its workers.  
Many might want to know about every aspect of a company’s behavior. 
Even this last, more all-embracing group may feel troubled at the 
prospect of equating one unit of environmental protection with one unit of 
corporate governance, social mission, or worker protection. How many 
tons of carbon can be released into the atmosphere in exchange for 
providing better health care benefits for workers? How many workers can 
be fired, paid substandard wages, or required to work under dangerous 
conditions in order to provide one underprivileged child with free 
computer programming lessons? How many independent directors on a 
company’s board may be exchanged for helping one less homeless 
veteran? 
All businesses must make difficult decisions about trade-offs.  Even 
purely profit-driven enterprises must decide how much to invest in 
developing a new product versus spending those same dollars marketing 
the old one; they must balance hiring a first-rate and well-motivated 
workforce with reducing costs to improve profit margins. Companies that 
aim to achieve a social purpose while also earning a profit face an even 
more complex task; they must balance each of their social goals against 
each other and against the need to earn money. These decisions are an 
inevitable part of being a pro-social enterprise; they cannot be avoided. 
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Although there is no avoiding trade-offs like these, companies should 
engage in these decisions self-consciously. They should form principles 
which guide their behavior and which can be articulated to the various 
stakeholder groups. These groups in turn can hold the company 
accountable, even if only rhetorically, for implementing these principles 
in good faith. In most cases, there probably can be no mathematical 
formula for how to trade one social good for another. Probably only 
economists believe that all goods can be translated into dollar form, or 
perhaps “utiles,”91 so that they can be exchanged based on some set ratio 
or more complex utility function (and perhaps not even very many 
economists believe this).92 But to say these decisions cannot be reduced to 
precise formulae is not to say that there can be no principles at all. These 
decisions are important to companies’ identity, mission, and culture and 
should be made thoughtfully with that fact in mind. 
The BIA also makes these trade-offs between categories of pro-social 
behavior, but it does so implicitly, with no clear statement of how or why 
it has drawn the equivalencies that it has. A point earned under the 
governance impact area is worth precisely as much as one earned under 
the environmental impact area. By deciding how many points each 
positive answer to a question is worth, then, the Council is impliedly 
saying that policies that garner the same number of points have equivalent 
worth to the world. But neither B Lab nor the Council has articulated a set 
of principles to explain why they have drawn the equivalences that they 
have. For example, the following two questions are each worth 3.5 points 
on the BIA: 
Beyond those required by law, for what % of your projects do you 
implement policies for monitoring and improving indoor air quality 
during construction?93 
What % of the company is owned by:: [sic] Women and/or 
individuals from chronically-underemployed communities [sic]94 
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Policies to improve indoor air quality during construction are, 
therefore, equivalently good for society, as measured by the BIA, to 
having owners who are women and members of chronically 
underemployed communities. 
It is not at all obvious why those two characteristics should be 
considered of equal worth. One could likely construct arguments favoring 
one or the other, perhaps even by a substantial margin. But neither the 
Council nor B Lab has provided any, even in general outline. 
The same problem occurs within impact areas as between impact 
areas, though to a somewhat lesser degree. That is, it may be somewhat 
easier to understand why some characteristics are more important than 
others within a given impact area, since the questions within an impact 
area are aimed at a more or less uniform goal. Within the environmental 
impact area, for example, the BIA’s questions attempt to ascertain the 
company’s environmental responsibility. Still, even within an area, it 
would be helpful to understand how the Council has decided to allocate its 
points. For both between impact areas and within them, a statement of 
general principles would go some distance, even without a detailed, 
question-by-question explanation. 
5. Inadequate Verification 
Even an ideal assessment tool is worth little if companies are free to 
lie in responding to the questions. To ensure an assessment is valid, 
therefore, there must be some mechanism that confirms companies’ 
responses are reasonably accurate. Otherwise, the information provided by 
the assessment will prove essentially meaningless, and the resulting 
certification will not be taken seriously. 
Publicly traded companies solve this problem in reporting their 
financial information by paying for outside auditors. Large accounting 
firms examine companies’ documents and validate the information 
disclosed in the companies’ public filings. In addition, public companies 
face liability under the securities laws,95 and their senior executives face 
potential criminal charges for purposefully distorting the information 
provided.96 
Benefit corporations that are privately held have far fewer legal 
safeguards to ensure that they are providing the public benefits they claim.  
The Model Act requires benefit corporations to produce and disclose on 
their websites an annual benefit report that describes the general and 
specific public benefits they provide.97 But there is no provision in the 
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Model Act imposing liability for providing false information in the benefit 
report. Stakeholders could conceivably sue under state fraud laws to 
remedy any false statements, but only if they could prove they were 
harmed by the fraud.98 Perhaps an investor who was defrauded into making 
a substantial investment in the company by fraud in the benefit report 
might have a sufficient injury for a cost-effective fraud action, or perhaps 
such an action could be prosecuted on behalf of consumers as a class 
action, but the damages in both cases could be difficult to ascertain. 
Moreover, the Model Act does not require external audits to ensure that 
benefit reports are accurate.99 
B Lab does have some measures to ensure the information companies 
provide on the BIA is accurate for companies seeking or maintaining B 
Corp certification. B Lab requires companies to submit documentation to 
support their responses to some randomly selected questions at both the 
initial certification and every recertification.100 There is also the disclosure 
questionnaire and the background check, discussed above, and a public 
complaint process. In addition, B Lab performs a more in-depth review of 
ten percent of certified companies each year and of all publicly traded 
certified companies, as well as those companies that are wholly owned by 
publicly traded companies.101 
These measures pale by comparison to the protections that exist for 
publicly traded companies in their financial disclosures and are likely to 
prove inadequate. Even those companies selected for certification 
evaluation will find the process sparse compared to a formal audit; B Lab 
estimates the process takes only six to ten hours.102 
Perhaps, though, there is little point in adding more elaborate 
safeguards. Despite all the protections that guard against misstated 
financial reports by public companies, public companies are sometimes 
discovered to have misstated their financial performance.103 Auditors 
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confirm the information disclosed to them comports with Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles, but they cannot assure that the financial 
statements are entirely accurate and free of fraudulent misstatements. The 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s standards require only 
“reasonable assurance” of a financial statement’s accuracy by outside 
auditors.104 As § 1015.10 states: 
The exercise of due professional care allows the auditor to 
obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements 
are free of material misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud, 
or whether any material weaknesses exist as of the date of 
management’s assessment. Absolute assurance is not attainable 
because of the nature of audit evidence and the characteristics of 
fraud. Although not absolute assurance, reasonable assurance is a 
high level of assurance. Therefore, an audit conducted in accordance 
with the standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (United States) may not detect a material weakness in internal 
control over financial reporting or a material misstatement to the 
financial statements.105 
The Model Act does require benefit corporations to publicize their 
benefit reports on their respective websites.106 Such disclosure may allow 
verification by the crowd to the extent false information can be detected 
without inside access to corporate information. For now, perhaps this 
should suffice. Requiring additional measures would add to the expense 
and complication of becoming a certified B Corp and might discourage 
companies from doing so. Unless and until fraud becomes a significant 
problem, the cost of adding safeguards seems to outweigh the likely 
benefits. 
C. Vision 
An assessment of a company’s pro-social impact needs to embody 
some underlying vision of what it means for a profit-seeking company to 
help society. In other words, there needs to be a coherent expression of 
what the assessment is trying to measure. One can imagine many different 
perspectives on what social missions are important, as well as different 
weightings even among those who agree on the fundamental goals. Some 
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might argue that environmental responsibility is most critical, while others 
might see worker empowerment, corporate governance, or another social 
mission as particularly vital. Because different stakeholders have different 
preferences, to be useful, an assessment must explain the individual vision 
underlying its evaluation metric so that users will know which assessment 
to choose. 
B Lab provides statements of its goals, which can be interpreted as 
its—or the Council’s—guiding vision for the BIA, in two places on its 
website. Under the heading, “Why B Corps Matter,” B Lab’s website 
states: 
Individually, B Corps meet the highest standards of verified social 
and environmental performance, public transparency, and legal 
accountability, and aspire to use the power of markets to solve social 
and environmental problems. 
Collectively, B Corps lead a growing global movement of people 
using business as a force for goodTM. Through the power of their 
collective voice, one day all companies will compete to be best for 
the worldTM, and society will enjoy a more shared and durable 
prosperity for all.107 
The first paragraph indicates that certified B Corps are socially and 
environmentally responsible, transparent to the public about their conduct, 
and legally accountable. These are vision statements, but they suffer from 
some significant problems. 
The first paragraph’s overarching vision is a conglomerate of five 
visions: social performance, environmental performance, 
transparency/verification, legal accountability, and implementation of a 
social mission. These five visions are in some tension, yet this is not 
acknowledged. For example, older technology may require more workers 
to operate it (which is good for workers and fulfills the social performance 
goal), but new technology may be cleaner (which is better for the 
environment and fulfills the environmental performance goal). Legal 
accountability and transparency may together lead to liability, which will 
sap the company’s ability to perform its social mission. The first paragraph 
does not indicate which of these principles should trump the others when 
they conflict. 
Also, it is far from clear that the BIA comports with the paragraph’s 
expressed vision. For example, it is unclear what the “highest standards” 
of social and environmental performance are. However, even if we assume 
that the BIA’s questions reflect those standards, companies can achieve 
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certification while adopting only a portion of them—enough to earn 80 
points on a 200-point scale.108 Also, as explained above, the certification 
process’s verification portion leaves much to be desired.109 Public 
transparency also could be much stronger; certification requires only quite 
limited transparency for most companies, though greater transparency is 
rewarded with a higher BIA score.110 Finally, neither the Model Act nor 
the rules governing B Corps impose any significant legal liability on a 
certified company, which would seem to be a requirement for “legal 
accountability.”111 
The second paragraph articulates laudable goals, but is so broad that 
it is hard to discern much substantive guidance. Business should be used 
as a force for good, where “good” seems to be defined as “a more shared 
and durable prosperity.” This prosperity should be “for all,” which seems 
a more ambitious version of the earlier statement that it be more widely 
shared. But how should businesses achieve this new, more widespread and 
more durable prosperity? And what is “prosperity”? Is it limited to greater 
access to material goods? That seems inconsistent with B Lab’s 
environmental goals, which often require people to use less, not more, 
material and energy. Like the first paragraph, there is a sense of a vision 
here, but the way it is expressed makes it difficult to implement. 
The other expression of a vision on B Lab’s website is its 
“Declaration of Interdependence.”112 The Declaration begins by repeating 
the second paragraph’s ambition that business be used as a force for good 
and that the benefits companies produce should be distributed to all 
stakeholders, not just the companies’ owners.113 It then goes on to list what 
B Corps believe: 
That we must be the change we seek in the world. 
That all business ought to be conducted as if people and place 
mattered. 
That, through their products, practices, and profits, businesses should 
aspire to do no harm and benefit all. 
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To do so requires that we act with the understanding that we are each 
dependent upon another and thus responsible for each other and 
future generations.114 
Like the two paragraphs that explain why B Corps matter, the 
Declaration embraces heartwarming rhetoric but does not provide much 
practical guidance for those trying to implement a coherent vision. 
Exhorting companies to “be the change” is an inspirational instruction to 
take personal responsibility for implementing a vision, but it is not itself a 
vision; it provides no substantive directions as to what sort of change one 
should be. 
The statement that companies should act as though “people and place 
mattered” is a bit cryptic. People are important, but which people and for 
what ends? The statement could refer to workers, customers, surrounding 
communities, or all fellow travelers on the planet. Each of these meanings 
would dictate very different strategies for acting as though people 
mattered. 
Place is even more mysterious. This could be read as an 
admonishment to avoid outsourcing, though it is far from clear that is what 
was intended. If so, the admonishment needs greater explication. Banning 
outsourcing requires a company to prioritize the needs of the local 
community over those of people who live far away. If all humans have 
equal dignity and worth, then this exhortation seems of dubious moral 
value, especially if those to whom the work would be outsourced suffer 
from far greater poverty and/or live in countries with far less 
comprehensive safety nets than those whose jobs are being shipped 
overseas. Also, in some cases the local community will not be the best 
place to produce a product from an environmental perspective, perhaps 
because the local environment is more sensitive than elsewhere. If so, 
should environmental concerns trump concerns about place? Finally, a ban 
on outsourcing seems to contradict the goal of a more widely shared 
prosperity. 
Aspiring to do no harm and benefit all laudably echoes Hippocrates’ 
admonition to physicians to “do no harm.”115 Unfortunately, all economic 
activity necessarily does some harm. Manufacturing solar panels will 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions and combat global warming, 
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commendable results that on balance should benefit the world. But the 
manufacturing process is not harm-free. Manufacturing goods requires the 
use of raw materials, which in turn often requires mining or other 
destructive methods to extract the raw materials from the planet’s crust. 
Even if extraction could be achieved without environmental degradation, 
manufacturing generally involves the use of nonrenewable raw materials 
such as iron, gold, aluminum, rare earths, and petroleum. There are more 
and less destructive manufacturing processes, but it is impossible to do no 
harm at all while manufacturing goods. Similar arguments could be made 
for agricultural activities and even the service industry. 
Benefitting all also sounds unobjectionable, but is equally impossible 
to implement. The category “all” presumably includes a company’s 
competitors, workers, customers, and communities. Business in the U.S. 
economy involves competition; we have developed an extensive body of 
law to ensure that competition is the norm.116 A company trying to develop 
a better or cheaper product does so in order to outsell the competition, 
taking away its competitors’ customers for itself. The goal of benefitting 
all seems inherently incompatible with a capitalist economy. 
Finally, the reminder that we are dependent on one another and that 
future generations depend on us is admirable and correct but not terribly 
helpful in making concrete decisions. The point of highlighting our mutual 
dependence seems very similar to the goal of companies benefitting all 
through their economic activities and shares the same practical problems. 
Intergenerational dependency fails to indicate what our obligations to 
future generations are. One perspective might be that our obligation to our 
grandchildren is to preserve as much of the planet’s natural resources as 
possible. This would suggest that we limit economic activity so that we 
minimize our use of nonrenewable raw materials. Another perspective 
might suggest that we should maximize our grandchildren’s standard of 
living. This goal would suggest the opposite approach, that we should 
increase industry and capital as much as possible so that our grandchildren 
can have lives that are more materially comfortable than our own. We 
should care about each other and about our descendants, but what actions 
does this admonition dictate? A coherent vision statement should guide us 
in making these decisions, not just provide an emotional framework. 
There is a limit to how much guidance a vision statement can be 
expected to provide. The point of a vision statement is to indicate an 
overall sense of the assessment’s goals and philosophy, not to dictate the 
outcome of every minute decision. Still, to be helpful, the vision statement 
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must consist of more than just platitudes, and when aspects of the vision 
are in tension, it should provide some sense of how to resolve conflicts 
when they arise. Examples of forms this guidance could take include a 
hierarchy of principles, mandatory minimum requirements for each 
principle that cannot be subverted, or a Rawlsian maximin principle.117 
There is no doubt that many other possibilities exist, but a vision statement 
that endorses more than one value should provide some method of 
resolving conflicts. 
D. Inclusivity 
An assessment that is simple, valid, and embodies a clear vision 
would still be pointless if no one used it. To achieve broad utilization, the 
assessment’s vision must be popular. Popularity could result from 
espousing narrow views that are widely held, or it could be achieved with 
a more ecumenical strategy of accepting a wide range of principles. Much 
depends on the size and viewpoints of the target audience. 
The Model Act imposes the outer limits on how expansive an 
assessment’s vision may be, but these outer limits are very broad. The 
Model Act defines both “general public benefit” and “specific public 
benefit.”118 Every benefit corporation under the Model Act must provide a 
general public benefit and has the option of providing a specific public 
benefit.119 
The Model Act defines “general public benefit” as “[a] material 
positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole, assessed 
against a third-party standard, from the business and operations of a 
benefit corporation.”120 Leaving aside the drafting oddity that included the 
requirement for a third-party standard in the definition, the definition 
imposes very few substantive requirements. Benefit corporations must 
produce a substantial and beneficial effect on “society.” The Model Act 
does not specify what counts as a “positive impact,” nor does it delineate 
the limits of whose interests count as part of “society,” leaving these terms 
as blank slates to be filled in by benefit corporations and the creators of 
third-party assessments. The definition does require, however, that benefit 
corporations help the environment as well as society; companies that wish 
to focus only on helping people and not places must find some other form 
of business organization. 
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Benefit corporations also have the option of adopting a “specific 
public benefit.” The definition of “specific public benefit” is similarly 
broad: 
(1) providing low-income or underserved individuals or communities 
with beneficial products or services; 
(2) promoting economic opportunity for individuals or communities 
beyond the creation of jobs in the normal course of business; 
(3) protecting or restoring the environment; 
(4) improving human health; 
(5) promoting the arts, sciences, or advancement of knowledge; 
(6) increasing the flow of capital to entities with a purpose to benefit 
society or the environment; and 
(7) conferring any other particular benefit on society or the 
environment.121 
One oddly absent category is religion. Religion is included as a 
permissible public purpose for nonprofit organizations that wish to qualify 
for tax-deductible contributions under IRC § 501(c)(3), yet it was not 
included in the Model Act.122 It is unclear why religion was not specifically 
listed here, but it would seem to fit under the very broad catchall provision 
in paragraph (7). 
For both the general and specific public benefits, then, the Model Act 
is highly permissive. The third-party assessments have tremendous 
latitude to shape their visions of what should count as a benefit to society 
or the environment with very few concrete limitations. To see just how 
inclusive the statutory definition is, imagine a company that develops and 
manufactures new televisions with improved image quality, and that this 
company also donates a small percentage of its profits to an organization 
that works to clean pollution from the world’s oceans. Such an 
organization is providing a public benefit and would qualify—assuming it 
met the Model Act’s other requirements—to form as a benefit corporation. 
It provides a benefit to society—better televisions—and delivers a 
material benefit to the environment through its donations.  It would also 
qualify as providing a specific benefit under paragraph five, because the 
company promotes the sciences and the advancement of knowledge 
through its research to create better televisions. A third-party assessment 
could be similarly inclusive if it so chose. 
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Note also that the catchall provision could include sharply 
controversial missions. An organization that worked to ban all abortions 
would count as providing a benefit to society by some people’s lights, as 
would an organization that attempted to provide free and legal abortions 
to all who needed one. Other than its emphasis on environmental benefits, 
the statute is apolitical. 
In some ways, the BIA has taken advantage of the range of 
possibilities furnished by the Model Act. The BIA awards points in four 
impact areas: governance, workers, community, and the environment.123 
The BIA thus embraces a broad vision of what counts as a positive impact 
on society. 
At the same time, the BIA imposes its vision on users of its 
assessment and does not provide much flexibility. Companies cannot 
become certified B Corps by excelling in only one of the four impact areas 
and abandoning the other three.124 They must achieve at least some points 
in each of the four areas if they expect to have a realistic chance of earning 
80 points and qualifying for certification.125 In this way, although the 
BIA’s vision is broad in that it encompasses a number of different types 
of positive impacts on society, it is also quite restrictive in that it requires 
companies that aspire to certification to pursue all of these areas. 
Companies do retain considerable flexibility, though, in deciding which 
areas to emphasize. 
The other way the BIA is less inclusive than it might be is that it 
awards points based on some activities that not all would agree should 
count as a benefit to society. I should note that these are largely the 
exception; the vast majority of the BIA’s judgments about what counts as 
beneficial to society or the environment are unlikely to prove 
controversial. But there are a few categories that seem potentially 
problematic. For example, the BIA awards points to companies that 
emphasize use of locally sourced parts.126 Sourcing locally may provide 
environmental benefits by reducing the need for transportation, but it may 
also result in producing goods in environmentally sensitive locations. 
Also, because this question is asked of companies in emerging economies, 
it may help with local economic development. On the other hand, local 
sourcing may deprive workers in other countries from badly needed jobs 
and may result in higher costs if local production is inefficient. Plus, 
companies that pay more for local inputs than they would for imported 
substitutes will have fewer resources available to pursue their social 
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missions. Some companies might reasonably conclude that buying local is 
not, on balance, pro-social. 
Another example is that the BIA rewards companies for granting 
board seats to certain stakeholder representatives, such as members of the 
local community, customers, environmental experts, and nonexecutive 
employees.127 Sometimes having such representatives can provide 
valuable advice and perspective to a benefit corporation as it attempts to 
balance its various goals. Other times, though, it may lead to co-option of 
the company by one group at the expense of others or of the company’s 
broader social purpose. A local community representative might advocate 
for an expansion of the local manufacturing plant to improve the local 
economy, as might a representative of the employees. The expansion 
might come at the expense of the local environment, though, and so 
contradict the company’s environmental mission. Granting stakeholders a 
voice also risks creating dissension and paralysis as groups advocate for 
their particular interests. Some companies might reasonably prefer to 
avoid giving voting seats on the board to stakeholder representatives for 
these reasons. 
That the BIA makes some controversial choices is largely inevitable. 
The vision goal and the inclusivity goal are necessarily in conflict. The 
stronger the vision, the more groups are likely to be excluded because they 
disagree with it. Conversely, having a “big tent” philosophy that includes 
all visions of what should count as a benefit to society, as the Model Act 
largely does, risks watering down the vision so much that the assessment 
ends up standing for nothing at all. 
The balance struck by the BIA seems quite reasonable. The BIA 
rewards a wide array of possible social benefits, yet still provides some 
sense that it has an overarching vision of what benefit corporations should 
do. The fact that the BIA’s position is reasonable, though, does not mean 
its choices will be appropriate for all benefit corporations. There remains 
a strong need for competing assessment tools that promote alternative 
visions to meet the needs of companies whose strategies do not fit well 
with the choices made by the BIA. 
The disadvantage of having multiple third-party assessment tools is 
that it becomes harder to compare and evaluate companies when they are 
measured by different metrics. As I argued above, however, even among 
companies that use the BIA, intercompany comparisons are difficult and 
likely inappropriate for companies that do not happen to fall into the same 
subcategory out of the seventy-two different possibilities. Perhaps, then, 
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having a variety of third-party assessments would not require much 
sacrifice in comparability. 
Competing assessment tools might also face a “race to the bottom” 
problem.128 The assessment’s authors might water them down in order to 
induce benefit corporations to use them. The competition’s result might 
then be, not a range of different but equally valid visions, but rather 
pressure to make the assessment as easy to pass as possible. When 
assessments are offered for free, as the BIA is, the incentive to attract users 
by weakening standards seems attenuated. Still, this is a danger worth 
monitoring if other entities develop competing assessments. 
E.  Reputational Capital v. Regulatory License 
When sellers have information that buyers lack about the unusually 
high quality of their goods or services, it is to the sellers’ advantage to 
convey that information to the buyers. Buyers who know that a seller’s 
products are unusually good will often be willing to pay more for them. 
Sometimes, though, it is expensive or impossible for a seller to convey this 
information in a way that will be believed by buyers. In such cases, 
economic theory holds that sellers will invest in their reputations or post a 
bond for an amount that will be transferred to disappointed buyers if the 
product is of lower quality than advertised.129 
When neither reputation investments nor bond posting are practical, 
there is a role for third-party intermediaries to play. A third party can 
certify the quality of a seller’s products, putting the intermediary’s own 
reputation at stake.130 A classic example of such an intermediary is a credit 
rating agency, such as Standard & Poor’s or Moody’s.131 The 
intermediary’s quality certification is credible because the intermediary is 
risking its own reputation by engaging in the certification. If the 
certification turns out to be mistaken, the intermediary will suffer a loss of 
reputational capital, making it more difficult to sell its certification in the 
future. In order to protect its reputational capital, then, the intermediary 
will take care to certify products accurately.132 
Frank Partnoy has argued convincingly that the reputational capital 
model may not apply when the law requires certification by an 
intermediary for some purpose. For example, the law requires a certain 
rating by a certified credit rating agency in order to permit certain types of 
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investors to purchase a bond.133 The credit rating agency, then, is not only 
providing an informational service, it is also serving as a regulatory barrier 
to entry. By providing issuers access to investors, the rating agencies sell 
a valuable service separate from the rating’s informational value. Because 
this gatekeeping function, or “regulatory license,” is so valuable, and 
because there are only three certified credit ratings agencies of any real 
market importance, the deterrent effect of harm to the rating agencies’ 
reputational capital caused by providing unduly optimistic credit ratings is 
severely diluted. Rating agencies may profit from selling inflated ratings 
to issuers even if purchasers disbelieve the ratings—so that the ratings 
serve little informational value—because they are providing a regulatory 
license to sell bonds and this license to enter the market is highly 
valuable.134 
There is some danger that Partnoy’s regulatory license theory will 
also apply to third-party assessment tools used by benefit corporations.135 
The Model Act imposes a number of requirements for third-party 
assessments, including some that restrict what sort of entities can create 
them.136 While it is unlikely that the BIA will be the only standard that will 
qualify, the number of choices may be limited. As a practical matter, 
because B Lab plays such a critical role in the benefit corporation 
movement, the BIA is likely to be the standard most companies use. 
Arguably, then, B Lab will not be deterred from weakening the standard 
by threats to its reputational capital, since it serves a regulatory license 
function by providing a standard to benefit corporations that they need to 
comply with the Model Act. 
Although this is an important concern, I do not believe it will 
materialize in the benefit corporation context the way it has with credit 
rating agencies. Unlike with credit ratings, where statutes require that 
issuers earn a certain credit rating from an outside agency to become 
eligible to take various actions, the Model Act requires only that benefit 
corporations evaluate themselves against some third-party standard.137 The 
Model Act does not demand that benefit corporations obtain some 
particular achievement level on these assessments.138 Also, the third 
party’s only involvement is in the creation of the assessment; companies 
                                                     
 133. See Partnoy, Siskel, supra note 12, at 690–703 (describing numerous examples of 
regulations requiring a particular credit rating). 
 134. See generally Partnoy articles, supra note 12. 
 135. Again, I am indebted to Frank Partnoy for this point. 
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 137. See id. § 401(a). 
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perform the evaluations themselves.139 B Lab and the Council therefore 
have essentially no power to permit or deny any statutory action a benefit 
corporation may desire to take and certainly have no authority to deny 
benefit corporation status to an entity that performs poorly on the BIA.  
Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see the BIA as analogous to 
credit-ratings agencies, who act as regulatory gatekeepers for a variety of 
important actions.140 
B Lab does control companies’ ability to declare themselves 
“Certified B Corps,” but this is not a designation that has any legal 
significance. Instead, this designation is best seen as a marketing tool 
companies may use to signal their pro-social status to various 
constituencies such as customers, employees, and investors. 
Still, to the extent the designation provides benefits that companies 
would otherwise be unable to obtain, “B Corp” status may be a closer 
analogy to the regulatory license scenario than the self-assessment the 
Model Act requires. As with a regulatory license, a third party exercises 
some control over a company’s ability to participate in a market activity, 
and, in this case, the ability to claim pro-social status and its attendant 
benefits. Therefore, there may be some danger that, similar to how credit 
ratings became important to issuers as a means to access certain markets 
rather than as an accurate predictor of the odds a company would default 
on its debt,141 B Lab’s certification will become valuable to companies 
more for the attendant marketing benefits than as a meaningful statement 
about the companies’ pro-social behavior. 
The risk here also seems rather small.  Unlike credit ratings, which 
have a legal effect separate from their information signal, B Lab’s 
certification is only meaningful as a method of branding a company as  
pro-social. The standard economic analysis of reputational capital should 
therefore apply to B Corp certifications. If companies with the certification 
behave in ways that seem inconsistent with the values underpinning the 
certification—if they are caught polluting the environment, for example, 
or ignoring their stated social mission, or treating their workers  
poorly—that will erode the value of the certification. B Lab and the 
Council therefore have a strong incentive to maintain the integrity of the 
certification and protect their reputational capital.  
One possible danger here stems from the “big tent” philosophy of the 
BIA. Because the BIA attempts to capture many different dimensions of 
pro-social behavior, it is not entirely clear what a failure of the standards 
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would mean.142 Credit ratings attempt to predict only one type of corporate 
behavior: the ability to make payments on the bond when due. Due to the 
probabilistic nature of these predictions, there is some ambiguity about 
what would constitute a failure. A high rating is not intended as a guaranty 
of payment, nor is a low rating a guaranty of default. Ratings are intended 
to measure probabilities, not certainties. But for the most part, a ratings 
agency that awarded a company’s bonds a high score would likely be seen 
to have failed if the company subsequently defaulted. The ratings agency 
should have signaled that there was a high likelihood of default but failed 
to do so. 
In contrast, it is far less clear precisely what B Corp certification 
signals. Companies can achieve certification by scoring 80 points out of a 
possible 200 on a self-assessment that measures a host of different 
behaviors. Those who rely on certification to measure a company’s 
behavior could be focusing on anything from a single aspect of the BIA to 
a detailed understanding of the BIA as a measurement tool to a gestalt 
sense of corporate benevolence. 
When a certified company later reveals that it has engaged in some 
behavior that might not live up to a user’s perception of what is appropriate 
for a certified company, is that a failure of the certification process? Will 
it undermine B Lab’s reputational capital, even if it involved conduct that 
was disclosed on the self-assessment? Conversely, the muddiness of the 
signal certification sends to the public may well shield B Lab’s 
reputational capital even when troubling corporate behavior becomes 
public, perhaps undermining the incentive B Lab has to protect the 
integrity of the certification process. 
It is too soon to judge what types of corporate behavior different 
segments of the public will perceive as a failure of the certification 
process. I suspect, though, that the greater danger is that B Lab’s reputation 
will be too easily undermined by a certified company’s poor behavior, 
rather than the reverse. 
CONCLUSION 
The BIA is a deeply considered and eminently reasonable third-party 
assessment tool for benefit corporations. Its flaws are, for the most part, 
the result of the inescapable tension between the goals of simplicity and 
validity and between those of vision and inclusivity. There are areas where 
it seems that the BIA can be improved along one dimension without undue 
sacrifice along another, however, and I have tried to indicate those areas 
to the extent possible. 
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Overall, I tried in this Article to point out the choices the BIA made 
with the hope that competing assessment tools will be developed that make 
other, equally reasonable, trade-offs among the four goals. I hope for 
alternatives, not because the BIA is flawed, but because different 
companies might prefer different sets of choices from among the menu of 
possible decisions, so there should be a variety of assessments available.  
I admire greatly the excellent and pioneering work done by B Lab and the 
Council, and I hope my small efforts in this Article will help them and 
other organizations that share their goals to improve on what is already a 
remarkable achievement. 
